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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NORMAN D. HAYWARD and
CLARENCE D. EV ANS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents
vs.
FRANK PENNOCK, LESLIE B.
WHITE, and JOSEPH MAZURAN,
as Chairman and Members of the
Salt Lake County Merit Service
Commission, respectively, Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Department,
Defendants-Appellants

CASE NO.
176216

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE

This is an action in the nature of injunction or extraordinary relief brought by Norman D. Hayward and Clarence D. Evans, Lieutenants in the Office of the Salt Lake
County Sheriff, who, by a Petition for Extraordinary Relief
(R. 1-3), sought to invalidate a Captains' Examination
given by the defendants who individually comprise the Salt
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Lake County Merit Service Commission, claiming the same
to be contrary to and beyond the authority conferred by
Chapter 30 of Title 17, Utah Code Annotated (The Merit
System Statute) .
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
The matter was tried before the Third Judicial District
Court, Judge Stewart M. Hanson presiding, on December
12, 1967. The Court entered its Memorandum Decision
December 13, 1967, amended the same December 14, 1967
(R. 12, 13), and executed its formal Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Judgment December 15, 1967 (R.
14-18). Said Findings, Conclusions and Judgment invalidated said Captains' Examination (which was administered
by the defendants, incidentally, on September 9, 1967) and
held the same to be null and void and further ordered the
defendants to vacate the eligibility register resulting from
said examination (R. 14).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Appellants contend that such Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment were in error and accordingly
filed their Notice of Appeal December 20, 1967 (R. 19), and
seek a reversal of the lower court's action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the time of trial there was admitted into evidence by
the stipulation of the parties the Rules and Regulations of
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the Merit Commission (Exhibit P-1), Minutes of the Commission's meeting held July 27, 1967 (Exhibit P-2), Minutes
of the meeting of the Commission held August 31, 1967
(Exhibit P-3) Minutes of the meeting of the Commission
held September 14, 1967 (Exhibit P-4), a letter of the Commission to Sheriff Larson dated August 7, 1967 (Exhibit
P-5), and a letter from the Commission to Sheriff Larson
dated September 29, 1967 (Exhibit P-6). Testimony was received from Frank M. Pennock, Commission Chairman,
Joseph Mazuran, a Commissioner, Donald Sawaya, a Deputy
County Attorney, and Donald S. Tingley, Deputy County
Clerk. A number of other exhibits were thereafter received
in the course of the testimony, some of which will be more
specifically alluded to hereinafter.
The Captains' Examination conducted by the defendants-appellants, who will hereinafter be referred to collectively as the Commission, was attacked by plaintiffsrespondents on three grounds which will be discussed in
some detail in the Argument hereinafter. There were, in
addition to the plaintiffs-respondents, four other candidates
who were given the Captains' Examination on September 9,
1967. Plaintiffs-Respondents failed to pass said written
examination (R. 45). The other four candidates, Arthur E.
Allen, Paul E. LaBounty, Larry J. Dow and Karl Ehlers,
passed the written examination and were placed on the
Captains' Register from which the Sheriff could make promotions to the rank of captain (Exhibit P-6).
At the time of the written examination, which consisted
of 190 questions (R. 31), the candidates were orally informed that in order to pass the same they would need a
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score of 143 correct answers to the 190 questions, which
constitutes 75% of the examination (R. 32). Mr. Pennock
was interrogated at some length at the trial about the ratio
of the written examination to the oral interview of the
candidates by the Commission, the in-time service of the
candidates, and the merit rating given each candidate by
the Sheriff ( R. 31-36, R. 48-51, Exhibit P-3), which will be
referred to in detail in the Argument hereinafter.
The remaining matters of fact relate to Minutes of
meetings of the Commission, notices or requirements therefor, etc., which will be discussed in relevant detail in the
course of the Argument.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
RELIEF PRAYED BY PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO SHOWING AT THE
TRIAL AN EXCEEDING OF STATUTORY AU.
THORITY, ABUSE OF DISCRETION, FRAUD,
COLLUSION, LACK OF GOOD FAITH OR CAPRI·
CIOUSNESS ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
Chapter 30 of Title 17 of the Utah Code Annotated,
hereinafter referred to as the Merit Act, from which the
Commission derives its authority and powers, has never
been construed in whole or part by this Court. It is axiomat·
ic, however, that any Merit Service Commission exercises
only its statutory powers and must find within its enabling
language whatever warrant it has for any authority it claims
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and further has only such powers as are expressly granted
it by statute or necessarily implied. People ex rel Polan vs.
Roehler, 405 Ill. 322, 90 NE 2d 729. Stauffer vs. San Antonio, 162 Tex. 13, 344 SW 2d 158. Rules adopted, therefore,
by a commission must be consistent with and not in excess
of said authority or constitutional grant. Hale vs. Worstell,
185 N.Y. 241, 77 NE 1177.
This Court has often reaffirmed the rule that the judicial branch of government will not interfere with discretionary acts of administrative agencies or commissions
absent the showing of fraud, collusion, capriciousness, etc.
A recent example is Clayton vs. Salt Lake City, (1963) 15
Utah 2d 57, 387 P. 2d 93, where the court said, through
Justice Crockett :
"The court is reluctant to interfere with the administrative function and would do so only if facts were
shown to indicate dishonesty, fraud, collusion or
lack of good faith in perf0rming the duty mentioned.
That is not demonstrated here."
With that general foundational law, at the outset it is
observed that plaintiffs-respondents attacked the validity
of the September 9, 1967 examination on three grounds.
(The Complaint itemizes four (R. 1, 2), two of which, however, deal with the matter of notice and will herein be considered singly). They were ( 1) that candidates then
ineligible to take said examination were allowed to be tested;
(2) that the notice from the written examination did not
comply with what plaintiffs-respondents contended were
statutory requirements, both as to requiring publishing notice of the examination and as to the announcement of minimum passing grade: and (3) that following the written
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examination and plaintiffs-respondents failing to pass the
same, plaintiffs-respondents were not further processed by
the Commi:;;sion, and the Commission allegedly failed tii
accredit plaintiffs-respondents properly for time in service,
merit rating and oral interview, as plaintiffs-responden~
contend the Merit Act requires the Commission to do.
With regard to the first challenge, the record is clear
that at Page 6 of Exhibit P-1, the Rules and Regulations of
the Commission adopted July 27, 1967, the Commission
provided: "All merit officers who have served an in-rank
term of not less than three ( 3) years shall be eligible to take
the competitive examination for the next promotional rank
above their present status." From the Minutes of the meet
ing held July 27, 1967 (P-2) where said Rules and Regulations were adopted by the Commission, discussion was had
about.the above quoted sentence. The Minutes read:
"Discussion was had relative to Rule 3-Examinations
and Subdivision 3.02(b)1 which provides that any
candidate for an examination have served in rank
for a term or not less than three years. It was agreed
that said rule ought to be part of the permanent
rules, but that inasmuch as the last examination
waived that requirement, and inasmuch as there was
an immediate need to fill vacancies on the captain
and lieutenant level, .md a new examination at either
level may shortly be needed, it was accordingly pro·
posed by Commissioner Mazuran, seconded by Dr.
White an unanimously passed that on the forthcom·
ing captain's examination this three years in-rank
requirement would again be waived."

Exhibits P-7 through P-17, together with the support·
ing testimony of Deputy County Clerk Donald S. Tingley,
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makes it reasonably clear that Lieutenants Karl Ehlers and
Paul LaBounty had not served in the rank of lieutenant for
three full years prior to September 9, 1967. The court below,
in its Memorandum Decision, as amended in paragraph
three ( R. 12) and in the Findings of Fact, paragraph 6
(R. 17), concluded that the above noted waiver of the
three-yea ... in-rank requirement was void and that only the
Rules and Regulations were applicable. Defendants-Appellants herein maintain that ruling was error. The controlling
case in point appears to be Weiss vs. Keefer, (1914), 3 Ohio
App. 426, 20 Ohio CCNS, 366, 36 Ohio CC 204. In that case
a Corporal in the Police Department was allowed to take a
promotional examination for Sergeant though he had served
less than the minimum two years required by the Civil
Service Commission's Rules. The Ohio Court of Appeals
ruled that such in-service requirement, having been created
by the Civil Service Commission in its Rules, it could be
waived by the Commission. The pertinent language of the
opinion reads as follows :
"We are of the opinion that the Civil Service Commission had the power to so waive or suspend this
rule, that its action in making all the corporals then
on the force eligible to this examination was within
its power, that the examination was within its power,
and that the examination was held according to law;
nor was it necessary to note on its minutes that a
rule had been suspended, there being no objection on
the part of any member, and all members being
present." (The "members" referred to in the opinion
refer to the membership of the Civil Service
Commission.)
As noted above, the evidence is clear that the unanimous intent and purpose of the Commission was to waive
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the three-year in-service requirement. There is nothing in
the Merit Act or the Commission's Rules and Regulations
that prevents it from so waiving or suspending a given rule.
Indeed, the Merit Act provides at 17-30-23: " ... it shall be
the duty of the Merit Service Commission to provide by rule
for the operation and functioning of any activity within the
purpose and spirit of the act which may be or may become
necessary and proper and which is not specifically provided
hereby." There being no showing in the Court below that
the waiver of the rule herein was in bad faith, capricious,
fraudulant, etc., the Trial Court should not have intruded
into the exercise of discretion by the Commission and set it
aside.
With regard to the second contention advanced by
Plaintiffs-Respondents, they maintain that the notice of the
September 9, 1967 examination did not conform to the Merit
Act requirements in two particulars: ( :1.) That the notice
was not published in a paper of general circulation within
the county; and (2) that the notice did not specify the passing grade. In the Court below Plaintiffs-Respondents relied
upon the provision of Section 17-30-6 ( 2) which provides:
"Notice of examination shall be published one time
not less than 15 days prior to the examination in a
newspaper of general circulation in the area concerned and shall be posted in a conspicuous place in
the office of the department concerned. The notice
shall set forth minimum and maximum wages, physical and educational requirements and passing
grades, which shall not be less than 70% ... "
It is to be noted, however, that this Section begins with the
following language :
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"At such time as may be necessary, the Commission
shall conduct open competitive examinations to determine the qualification of applicants for positions
as peace officers . .. ' (Emphasis added.)
It is clear, from a reading of the Section as a whole, that it

relates to original competitive examinations open to the
public for beginning peace officers newly recruited into the
Sheriff's employ. This interpretation is further re-enforced
by the provisions of Section 17 -30-12 (2) relating to vacancies occurring within the system and promotions and
provides:
"Vacancies occurring in the Merit System classification of ::my county shall be filled by promotion in so
far as possible. A promotion shall be made only after
open competitive examination, admission to which
shall be limited to Merit System officers . .." (Emphasis added.)
This section relating to promotional examinations limited to
Merit System officers contains no language prescribing notice or what form such notice, if any, should take, nor what
items should be therein included. The Merit Commission's
Rules (Exhibit P-1) provide under Rule 3, pages 5-7, for
examinations and specify, at Rule 3.02, two types of examination: (a) For the applicants for the office of deputy; and
(b) for promotional or in-rank examinations. At Rule
3.02(b)2, it reads:
"Notice of such in-rank examinations shall by letter
be transmitted by the Commission to the Sheriff,
and the Sheriff shall transmit said notice by posting
or letter or otherwise, whichever is best calculated
to give actual notice to the eligible officers, in writSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

ing, that a competitive examination is to be given.
Said notice shall be given not less than thirty (30)
days prior to the date on which the examination is
to be given."
In connection with the Captain's Examination in issue,
notice was transmitted te Sher!ff Larson by letter (Exhibit
P-5) dated August 7, 1967 as follows:
"In that connection, you are hereby notified, pursuant to the rules and regulations of this Commission,
that an in-rank examination for the position of Captain will be given by this Commission on Saturday,
September 9, 1967, at a place and time the Commission will designate. The examination will be taken
from, but not limited to, the Utah Code, the Rules
and Regulations of the Salt Lake County Merit Service Commission, the current Red Cross Manual, the
traffic code of Salt Lake County and the State of
Utah and related questions on law enforcement and
additional questions concerned with responsibilities
of command."
Plaintiffs-Respondents asserted no claim in the Court
below and there is no• evidence to the effect that eligible
candidates or otherwise failed to receive appropriate notice,
nor that any of them complained at the time of the giving
of the test that they were prejudiced by not being informed
previously what the passing grade for the examination
would be. On the contrary, Plaintiffs-Respondents and all
other eligible lieutenants (including the two Plaintiffs- Respondents contend were ineligible) appeared at the appropriate time and place and were examined.
This situation seems analogous to that in the case of
Almassy vs. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission,
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(1949) 34 C. 2nd 387, 210 P. 2nd 503, 514. In that case the
Appellant sought to invalidate two promotional Civil Service
examinations because of an evaluation technique employed
by the Commission using a "general qualifications apprisal
record" relating to voice, speech, judgment, poise and other
general personality traits arrived at through oral interview
by examiners. Appellant contended these appraisals did not
constitute "open competitive examination" as required by
the State and the Commission's Rules. The Court there said:
"In determining the problem of the validity of the
two promotional civil service examinations here in
question, it must be remembered that petitioner does
not claim that there was any arbitrary, fraudulent,
or capricious action on the part of the commission,
or any person acting on its behalf, in the conduct of
the examinations, but confines his objections solely
to the propriety of the method of procedure adopted
by the commission for testing the candidates. In
view of the conclusion that the examinations as prescribed by the commission were appropriate to the
competitive selection of civil service personnel, and
in the absence of any charge or showing that the
commission, or anyone acting in this matter, proceeded otherwise than honestly and in good faith in
the evaluation process, petitioner cannot prevail in
this mandamus proceeding." (Emphasis added.)

Again, the notice requirements for promotional examinations restricted to Merit System officers clearly should
be different than an open competitive examination to the
public for incoming deputies. The Rules of the Commission,
the notice actually given, seem reasonable and well within
the omnibus authority given the Commission to "provide by
rule" for its operations and functions under the Merit Act.
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It was accordingly error, therefore, for the Trial Court to
impose the duty of published notice and providing therein
the passing grade.

As to Plaintiffs-Respondents third and final contention,
they maintain that the fad that the Commission failed to
consider their time in service, their merit rating, and re.
fused to further process them with a physical examination
and oral interview prejudiced their interest and was con.
trary to the mandatory language of Section 17-30-12 (2).
The relevant language therein provides :
"Such examination shall include an average of service ratings for the next preceding year, a rating of
seniority, and test the competence of the peace offi.
cer to perform the duty required in the position for
which application is made. The combined weights of
service rating and seniority shall be not more than
40% of the whole examination."
The issue here, therefore, is another of the Rules of the
Commission, or rather parts of two Rules. They are as
follows: (Exhibit P-1, p. 6) Rule 3.02 (b) 4:
"4. Upon passing said written examination, candi·
dates will be further rated by the Com.mission as
follows:
The written examination shall constitute sixty per
cent ( 60%) of the rating; personal interview with
the Commission, twenty per cent (20%); merit rating, fifteen (15%) and seniority, five per cent (5%).
5. All candidates in addition to the above examinations must meet the physical and agility requirements promulgated by the Commission.
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8.03 Minimum Grades. The Commission may determine a minimum grade for all or any part or parts
of the examinations as provided for above. Any applicant who fails to meet the minimum grade set by
the Commission shall be considered as failed the examination and his application shall not be further
processed and he shall be so notified."
It is further provided in the Minutes of the Merit Commission of its meeting August 31, 1967 (Exhibit P-3) as
follows:

"It was proposed by the Chairman and unanimously
carried by the Commission in accordance with the
earlier discussion of this Commission that there
would be approximately 200 questions, and that a
passing grade would need to be 753. The written
test would constitute 603 of the total rating; the
merit rating, time in service and oral interview
would constitute the remaining 403. Any candidate
failing to pass the written examination would be processed no further. It was further proposed l:ly the
Chairman, seconded by Dr. White and unanimonsly
carried that those candidates who were further processed, having passed the written examination,
would be required to receive at least 363 of the possible 403 in order to be placed on the eligibility
register."
As noted in the Statement of Facts, Chairman Pennock
was interrogated in detail about the written examination,
the percentage of the overall rating that examination bore
in ratio to the oral interview, in service time and merit
rating. On cross examination by his own counsel, Mr. Pennock further indicated that not only did Plaintiffs-Respondents fail the written examination, but that they were processed no further (R. 44, 45). He was asked if he had
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in his possession the individual records of Plaintiffs-Respon.
dents and replied in the affirmative; he was then asked if
in the files there appeared both the years in service for
Plaintiffs-Respondents and their individual merit ratings,
and he responded that such were in the files (R. 45).
He was then asked :
"Q. Assuming, Mr. Pennock, that an oral interview

had been given, which, as I understand it, would be
your final element with regard to further processing,
is that correct?
A. Yes.

Q. Assuming that such an interview had been given
in each of the instances of the plaintiffs herein and
they had received the maximum number of points,
which I believe you testified was 20, is that correct1

A. Yes.
Q. Then in that event, apart from their failing or
passing the written test, would the plaintiffs have
been eligible, without again giving any numbers, to
have been placed on an eligibility roster for captain1

MR. McRAE: Objection.
THE COURT: Let's make the record. The objection
will be noted. Go ahead.

A. No." (R. 45-6).
When questioned as to why the Commission adopted the
policy of not further processing candidates who failed the
written portion of the examination, Mr. Pennock said:
"A. The Salt Lake County Commission has given the
Merit Commission a rather limited budget, and with
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this thought in mind if we had continued to process
everyone who took the examinations I don't believe
that we would have had the finances to do it.
Q. What finances are needed with regard to further

processing?

A. Medical examinations. They had to be part of
this. So would much time in personal interviewing,
and we felt this was extremely important and wanted to be sure the interview was meaningful to the
men that took it, and it was just a matter of plain
economics.
Q. Those were considerations that lead to the adoption of that specific rule, 3.03?

A. Basically, yes." (R. 60-61).
The ruling of the New Jersey Supreme Court in a cei,ae
of remarkable similarity seems pertinent here. It is Zicherman vs. Departmwt of Civil Service, (1963) 40 N.J. 347,
192 A. 2d 566. In that case an examination was given by the
Department of Civil Service for the Clerk of the District
Court of Essex County. The test included a written and an
oral portion. The appellant took the examination with three
others. Two of the four passed the written portion. The
Statement of Facts in the opinion continues as follows:
"Two of the applicants achieved a passing score on
the written test. The other two, including the appellant, failed to achieve a score of 70% on the written
test and, in accordance with civil service practice,
were excluded from further participation in the
examination."
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The appellant thereafter claimed the examination was irn.
proper both as to the manner in which it was given, that the
questions bore no relationship to the duties of the clerk, and
that he was prejudiced in not being given the oral portion
of the examination in order to demonstrate his knowledge
and nkill and ability to discharge the duties of clerk The
Court there ruled :
"The preparation and administration of civil service
examinations is an administrative function 'delegat
ed most liberally to the authorized examiners of the
Department (of Civil Service) by the Legislature.'
Artaser:w vs. Dept. of Ciuil Service, 37 N.J. Super.
98, 105, 117 A. 2d 22, 26 (App. Div. 1955). The fuJ.
f1llment of that function is a matter requiring spe.
cial expertise, involving as it does the determination
of what job knowledge, skills and abilities are neces·
sary or desirable in a candidate for a particular
position, and the highly technical problem of devising suitable examina~<ion questions which will dern·
onstrate as accurately as possible whether an
applicant possesses those requirements sufficiently
to qualify for the position. See Brotspies v. Dept. oj
Civil Service, N.J. 66 N.J. Super. 492, 496-498, rn
A. 2d 484 (App. Div. 1961).
In view of the above, the courts cannot intervene to
nullify a civil se:rvice examination unless it is clearli
shown that the Department has abused its discretion.
See Planagan ·v. Civil Service Department, 29 N.J. l
12, 148 A. 2d 14, 20 (1959), where this court said:
'It is important to the efficient functioning of th<
public service employment program that ' ( c) ourtf
should let administrative boards and officers worl
out their problems with as little judicial interfer·
ence as possible. They may decide a particular
question wrong--but it is their question. (The!
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are) vested with a high discretion and its abuse
must appear very clearly before the courts will
interfere.' Maxwell v. Civ'il Service Commission,
169 Cal. 336, 146 P. 869, 871 (Sup. Ct. 1915). If
there is any fair argument in support of the
course taken or any reasonable ground for difference of opinion among intelligent and conscientious officials, the decision is conclusively legislative, and will not be disturbed unless patently
corrupt, arbitrary or illegal. Doubts held by the
court as to the wisdom of the administrator's decision do not alter the case.'
See also, Kelly v. Ci11il Service Com., 37 N.J. 450, 460,
181 A. 2d 745 (1962); Brotspies v. Dept. of Civil
Service, N.J. 72 N.J. Super. 334, 342, 178 A. 2d 367
(App. Div. 1962) ; Artaserse v. Dept. of Civil Service, Supra, 37 N.J. Super., at p. 105, 117 A. 2d, at p.
26."
Also of importance is the language in a similar opinion
from the District Court of Appeals of California in the case
of Amerio vs. City and County of San Francisco, (1954)
126 Cal. App. 2d 359, 271 P. 2d 996:
"We are satisfied that the facts disclosed by this evidence furnish a reasonable basis for the determination of the Civil Service Commission and: 'Where
the position is one as to the proper mode of filling
which there is fair and reasonable ground for difference of opinion among intelligent and conscientious officials, the action of the commission should
stand, even though the courts may differ from the
commission as to the wisdom of the classification.'
Pratt v. Rosenthal, 181 Cal. 158, 163-164, 183 P. 542,
544.''
Since the Statute in question requires that the written
portion of an examination constitute at least 60% of the
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overall rating, is a regulation or policy of a testing com.mis.
sion, per se, invalid if it requires that a candidate must firs!
pass that written portion before being allowed other factors
to figure into his overall grade'? Clearly, that determination
is a matter of discretion with the Commission. Clearly, fur.
ther, such a ruling hardly appears capricious, fraudulen!
or otherwise irrational as to justify judicial interference.
Holding that the examination sD.ould be stricken as null and
void "for failing to inc>Jde in said test all of the items spe.
cified by Statute" (R. 14) is another interference on the
part of the Court with the proper exercise of discretion by
the Commission which this Court should reverse.
Giving the Plaintiffs-Respondents the maximum digni.
ty affordable to their position and assuming that this refusal
to process them having failed the written examination wa~
ultra vires and contrary to statutory mandate, then,
in that event, at worst, ·the Commission should have been
ordered by the District Court below to further process these
candidates. It should not have ordered the test to be nullified.
The rights of the other candidates who successfully
passed the written portion of the examination should equally
be considered by the Court. It is t0 be borne in mind as well
that the written examination itself, the questions, the con·
tent, the manner in which it was given, are not contPsted by
Plaintiffs-Respondents and should, accordingly, remain in
full force and effect together with the eligibility register
derived therefrom. As noted above, however, even had tht
Plaintiffs-Respondents been further processed and bee1
given the maximum available points from the other areas oi
merit rating, oral interview and service time, even in thal
event they would have been ineligible to be placed on such a
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register. These being the facts, invalidating the test is the
more prejudicial to those other candidates who in good faith
took and passed the examination.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants-Appellants submit
that the Trial Court erred in granting the Plaintiffs-Respondents the relief prayed below, and said judgment in its
entirety should accordingly be reversed with instructions to
dismiss Plaintiffs-Respondents' complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
Attorneys for
Defendants-Appellants
GORDON A. MADSEN
RONNOW, MADSEN & TANNER
57 4 East 2nd South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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